




Crawford’s Expansive Definition of “Oppose” 
Breathes New Life into Pure Third-Party 
Retaliation Claims Under Title VII 
Michael Costello† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Eric Thompson worked as a metallurgical engineer for North 
American Stainless, LP (Stainless) for six years.1  Three years into 
Thompson’s employment, Stainless hired Miriam Regalado as a quality-
control engineer.2  Shortly after Thompson met Regalado, the two began 
dating.3  Their relationship was common knowledge at the company, and 
the couple eventually became engaged to be married.4 
While employed at Stainless, Thompson’s fiancée, Regalado, felt 
that her supervisors treated her differently because she was a woman.5  
The open disrespect Regalado’s supervisors displayed led to disrespect 
by Regalado’s subordinate employees.6  Eventually, Regalado suspected 
one of her subordinate employees was deliberately sabotaging equipment 
in order to have Regalado removed.7  When her concerns were not ad-
dressed by Stainless, Regalado filed a complaint with the Equal Em-
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 1. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 567 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 2. Brief of Plaintiff at 6, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 435 F. Supp. 2d 633 (E.D. Ky. 2006) 
(No. 3:05-02-JMH). 
 3. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 806. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Brief of Plaintiff, supra note 2, at 8. 
 6. Id. at 9. 
 7. Id. 
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ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).8  The complaint alleged 
that Stainless discriminated against her based on her gender.9  Three 
weeks after Stainless received Regalado’s complaint, the company ter-
minated her fiancé, Thompson, despite giving Thompson a favorable 
evaluation only three months earlier.10 
In response, Thompson filed suit in federal district court alleging 
that Stainless unlawfully retaliated against him in violation of Title VII’s 
anti-retaliation provision.11  This provision prohibits employers from tak-
ing adverse actions against an employee as a result of the employee’s 
opposition to an unlawful employment practice or the employee’s partic-
ipation in an investigation of an unlawful employment practice.12  If an 
employee raises a Title VII concern, the employer may not retaliate 
against that employee.13 
Despite Thompson’s allegations that Stainless fired him because of 
a Title VII complaint, the district court dismissed his claim.14  The court 
held that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision does not protect Thompson 
because the provision requires that an individual personally engage in a 
protected activity; that is, the individual must oppose an unlawful em-
ployment practice or participate in an investigation.15  Because Thomp-
son had not personally opposed or participated, the court ruled that 
Thompson had not done anything that qualified as a protected activity.16  
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s reading of the 
statute.17  The Sixth Circuit held that while Regalado, by filing a com-
plaint with the EEOC, had engaged in a protected activity and, thus, was 
protected from any retaliatory action by Stainless, this same provision 
did not protect her fiancé, Thompson.18  In so holding, the Thompson 
court joined the majority of circuit courts in the view that Title VII’s an-
ti-retaliation provision does not provide protection to close associates 
and relatives who are victims of adverse employment actions as retalia-
tion against an employee raising a Title VII claim.19 
                                                            
 8. Id. at 10. 
 9. Id. at 8. 
 10. Id. at 14. 
 11. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 567 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 806. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 564 (3d Cir. 2002); Smith v. Riceland 
Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 820 (8th Cir. 1998); Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th 
Cir. 1996). 
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The Thompson court’s holding aligns with other courts’ narrow 
reading of the class protected by Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.20  
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that the purpose of the anti-
retaliation provision is to encourage employees to bring claims of dis-
crimination and “deter the many forms that effective retaliation can 
take,”21 the majority of courts continue to deny the anti-retaliation provi-
sion’s protection to victims of third-party retaliation such as Thompson.22 
But in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Da-
vidson County, Tennessee, the Supreme Court greatly expanded the 
scope of protected classes by expanding the definition of how an indi-
vidual may “oppose” an unlawful employment practice and what indi-
viduals qualify for protection under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provi-
sion.23  Under Crawford’s definition, opposing an unlawful employment 
practice may be accomplished without active behavior, and protection 
may even be afforded to those who harbor silent opposition.24 
Crawford’s expansive definition of the term oppose should be read 
to extend protection to previously unprotected third-party victims of re-
taliation.  The policy of Title VII—to eradicate discrimination in the 
workplace25—as well as the policy of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provi-
sion—to foster an environment in which employees will not be dissuaded 
from bringing forward claims of discrimination26—mandates that courts 
extend the protection of these provisions to those who are victims of re-
taliation as a result of a relationship with a party who brings forward a 
Title VII discrimination claim.  The expanded definition of oppose pro-
vided by Crawford allows courts to make such an extension. 
This Comment argues that courts should read Crawford’s expanded 
definition of oppose to extend the protection of Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision to pure27 third-party victims of retaliation.  Part II of 
this Comment presents a history of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.  
Part III discusses the holding of Crawford and its potential impact on 
pure third-party retaliation claims under Title VII.  Part IV explains how 
reading Crawford to allow third-party retaliation claims furthers the poli-
                                                            
 20. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 564; Riceland Foods, 151 F.3d at 820; Holt, 89 F.3d at 1227. 
 21. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006). 
 22. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d 561; Riceland Foods, 151 F.3d 813; Holt, 89 F.3d 1224. 
 23. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 850 
(2009). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (2009). 
 26. See Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 63–64. 
 27. “Pure” third-party retaliation means the victim of the employer’s retaliation “has commit-
ted no offense other than having a relationship” with the protected employee.  Alex B. Long, The 
Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of Association in the 
Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931, 933–34 (2007). 
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cy goals of Title VII.  Part V concludes that courts should read Crawford 
as extending Title VII’s anti-retaliation protections to victims of pure 
third-party retaliation. 
II.  REQUIREMENTS OF TITLE VII’S ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION AND 
THE HISTORY OF PURE THIRD-PARTY RETALIATION CLAIMS 
A principal goal of Title VII is to end discrimination in the 
workplace.28  To achieve this goal, Title VII contains several provisions 
that protect employees facing discrimination, harassment, or retaliation.29  
The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII is essential to accomplishing 
the purpose of the statute.  This Part explains the purpose and language 
of the anti-retaliation provision, the requirements of a retaliation claim, 
and the way courts have viewed the anti-retaliation claim provisions as 
related to pure third-party claims. 
A.  Purpose and Language of Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision 
Title VII prohibits qualified employers30 from discriminating 
against any individual on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or nation-
al origin.31  To achieve the primary goal of Title VII—ending workplace 
discrimination—the statute relies on individual employees who are will-
ing to bring forward instances of discrimination by filing claims and act-
ing as witnesses.32 
Section 704(a) of Title VII sets forth the anti-retaliation provision, 
which protects employees who bring claims of discrimination against an 
employer.33  The primary purpose in enforcing the anti-retaliation provi-
sion of Title VII is to “maintain[] unfettered access to statutory remedial 
mechanisms” for employees.34  Because enforcement of Title VII relies 
on individuals bringing forth claims, the statute must protect employees 
who allege an employer is engaged in a discriminatory practice.  If an 
employee who raises a concern about her company’s adverse treatment 
of women is fired or demoted as a result of raising that concern, not only 
                                                            
 28. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674. 
 29. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2–2000e-3 (2006).  These provisions are often referred to as Sec-
tion 703 and 704.  Section 703 provides the substantive protections of Title VII, while Section 704 
provides the anti-retaliation provision. 
 30. A qualified employer includes a “[1] ‘person,’ [2] ‘engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce,’ [3] who has at least fifteen employees for twenty weeks during the current or preceding 
calendar year.”  JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES AND 
MATERIALS 18 (7th ed. 2009) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2006)). 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
 32. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 66. 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006). 
 34. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 54 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 
(1997)). 
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will the affected employee be less likely to maintain her claim, but other 
employees will also be less likely to bring claims of their own.  If not for 
the anti-retaliation provision, the effectiveness of Title VII would be 
greatly reduced.35  By attempting to protect employees who raise claims 
of discrimination, the anti-retaliation provision aims at fostering an envi-
ronment in which employees feel comfortable bringing forward claims of 
discrimination, increasing the effectiveness of the anti-discrimination 
provisions of Title VII.36 
The language of the anti-retaliation provision makes it unlawful for 
an employer to discriminate against an employee because “he has op-
posed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this Title, 
or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing.”37  Thus, to qualify 
for protection, one must oppose an unlawful employment practice or par-
ticipate in an investigation.38 
There is no requirement that a party seeking protection under the 
provision show that actual discrimination took place.39  As part of the 
prima facie case for retaliation, the plaintiff need only establish that he 
had a reasonable belief that the employer’s employment practice was 
unlawful to qualify for protection.40  Thus, if an employee believes that 
her employer is engaged in a discriminatory practice and files a com-
plaint, that employer cannot retaliate, even if an investigation reveals that 
the employer did not violate Title VII.41  This broad scope of protection 
serves the policy goals of Title VII by encouraging employees to invoke 
the investigative measures triggered by a Title VII claim42 without fear 
that their claims must be successful to be protected.43  This extended pro-
tection may make succeeding on a claim of retaliation easier than suc-
ceeding on a claim of discrimination under the substantive protections of 
Title VII, Section 703.  That an employee seeking protection under the 
anti-retaliation provision need not prove the employer actually discrimi-
                                                            
 35. Id. at 67. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 62. 
 38. See Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 39. Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1137 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See id. 
 42. A complaining party cannot bring a private suit unless the party first receives authorization 
from the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC).  Johnson v. Nekoosa-Edwards Pa-
per Co., 558 F.2d 841, 847 n.12 (8th Cir. 1977).  The EEOC is charged to investigate the allegation 
and attempt conciliation or other such remedial action.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2006).  Thus, when a 
party makes a Title VII claim, it triggers an investigative effort by the EEOC and corresponding 
attempts to remedy any unlawful employment practice. 
 43. See Hearth v. Metro. Transit Comm’n, 436 F. Supp. 685, 688–89 (D. Minn. 1977). 
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nated may explain the rise of retaliation claims—10% in the last eleven 
years.44  While succeeding on a claim of retaliation may be easier than a 
claim under the substantive protections of Title VII, a potential plaintiff 
must still prove a prima facie case.45 
B.  Establishing the Prima Facie Case of Retaliation 
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a 
plaintiff must show that: (1) he or she engaged in activity protected by 
Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action against 
him or her; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected ac-
tivity and the adverse employment action.46 
1.  Protected Activity 
The first element of a prima facie case of retaliation requires an 
employee to show she was engaged in a protected activity.47  Title VII’s 
anti-retaliation provision uses two clauses to define protected activities: 
the “participation clause” and the “opposition clause.”48  These two 
clauses protect different kinds of conduct, and courts have held that the 
clauses provide different amounts of protection.49 
The participation clause protects employees who have “made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investiga-
tion, proceeding, or hearing.”50  This clause protects individuals who ei-
ther have made claims of discrimination under Title VII or were involved 
in subsequent investigations of discrimination.51  The statute uses the 
language “in any manner,” and courts have interpreted this language to 
mean an inclusive scope of activities fall under the participation clause.52 
                                                            
 44. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGE STATISTICS: FY 1997–2009, 
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Nov. 6, 2010). 
 45. See generally Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); Payne, 654 
F.2d at 1130. 
 46. Payne, 654 F.2d at 1136. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 850 
(2009). 
 49. “The distinction between participation clause protection and opposition clause protection is 
significant because the scope of protection is different.”  Vaughn v. Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147, 
1151 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 n.4 (4th 
Cir. 1998)). 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006). 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006). 
 52. See Vaughn, 537 F.3d at 1151 (“[T]he scope of protection for activity falling under the 
participation clause is broader than for activity falling under the opposition clause.” (quoting Laugh-
lin, 149 F.3d at 259 n.4)). 
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The opposition clause protects employees who have “opposed any 
practice made an unlawful employment practice” by Title VII.53  Con-
duct protected under the opposition clause need not come in the context 
of an investigation or invoke the formal processes of a Title VII claim.54  
Because the party’s relation to a Title VII claim is less formal, the scope 
of protection offered under the opposition clause is smaller than the par-
ticipation clause.55  For example, if an employee claims protection under 
the opposition clause, courts will analyze whether the opposing conduct 
was reasonable under the circumstances.56  Additionally, courts must 
balance the interests of the employer in running the business against the 
employee’s right to express any grievances.57 
The different standards of protection therefore make classification 
of an employee’s conduct as either participating or opposing important.  
The amount of protection afforded to an individual depending on the 
classification can vary significantly.58  For example, an employee’s com-
plaints about low pay based on gender are not protected activities under 
the narrower opposition clause, but an employee’s illegal transmission of 
unredacted and confidential medical files to the EEOC to support a claim 
of discrimination is a protected activity under the broader coverage of the 
participation clause.59 
2.  Adverse Employment Action 
The second element of a prima facie case of retaliation requires that 
the employer take an “adverse employment action” against the em-
ployee.60  Section 704(a) of Title VII states that an employer may not 
“discriminate against” an employee as retaliation for that employee’s 
engagement in a protected activity.61  Before 2006, the standard for what 
actions constituted discriminating against an employee was unclear.62  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Rail-
                                                            
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006). 
 54. See Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259. 
 55. See Vaughn, 537 F.3d at 1151. 
 56. Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1142 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Compare Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 233 (1st 
Cir. 1976) (woman’s repeated complaints that her salary was low because she was a woman was not 
a protected activity under opposition clause of 704(a)), with Vaughn, 537 F.3d at 1151 (nurse’s 
copying and transmitting unredacted and confidential medical records to EEOC, though illegal, was 
a protected activity under the participation clause of 704(a)). 
 59. Vaughn, 537 F.3d at 1151; Hochstadt, 545 F.2d at 233. 
 60. Payne, 654 F.2d at 1136. 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006). 
 62. See generally Melissa A. Essary & Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under Title 
VII, the ADEA, and the ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, Unresolved Courts, 63 
MO. L. REV. 115, 130 (1998). 
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way Co. v. White clarified the meaning of discriminate against as it re-
lates to Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.63  The Court held that an 
action discriminates against an employee who has engaged in a protected 
activity if the employee “would have found the challenged action mate-
rially adverse.”64  An action by an employer qualifies as materially ad-
verse if the action “might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from 
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”65  The Court held the 
challenged action must be materially adverse to ensure that “petty 
slights” and “minor annoyances” would not become actionable retalia-
tion claims.66  Additionally, the definition sets forth an objective stan-
dard: a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all the 
circumstances, judges the adversity of the employer’s action.67  The 
Court intentionally left the standard in general terms, adding that when 
courts determine whether retaliation is present, “context matters.”68 
The broad standard imposed by the Court provides protection from 
a wide variety of employer actions, including adverse actions that take 
place outside of the work environment.69  The Court explained that such 
an expansive view of adverse actions was necessary because “a provision 
limited to employment-related actions would not deter the many forms 
that effective retaliation can take.”70  This expansive view aligns with the 
anti-retaliation provision’s policy objective—to “allow unfettered access 
to statutory remedial mechanisms”—because it protects employees from 
retaliatory actions that would likely restrict an employee’s access to the 
protections of Title VII.71  Because Title VII enforcement relies on em-
ployees bringing forth concerns, and retaliation would lessen the likelih-
ood that they would do so, employers must be barred from retaliating 
against employees outside the workplace.  The Court’s broad reading of 
the language of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision indicates a prefe-
rence towards a generally expansive reading of Title VII to give effect to 
the statute’s policy of ensuring that employees are not deterred from 
making discrimination claims. 
                                                            
 63. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quoting Rochon v. 
Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 71. 
 68. Id. at 69. 
 69. Id. at 63. 
 70. Id. at 64. 
 71. Id. at 54 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)). 
2011] Third-Party Retaliation Claims Under Title VII 561 
3.  Causal Relationship 
The third element in the prima facie case requires a plaintiff to 
show that the employer took the adverse employment action against the 
employee as a result of the employee’s engagement in a protected activi-
ty.72  This requirement is often the most difficult element for a plaintiff to 
meet because direct evidence of the employer’s intent is usually not rea-
dily available.  To prove such a causal relationship, the plaintiff must 
show that the employer was aware that the employee was engaged in a 
protected activity.73  Generally, a mere showing that the adverse action 
took place soon after the employee engaged in a protected activity is in-
sufficient to demonstrate a causal connection.74  Additionally, the em-
ployer can avoid liability by showing that the adverse employment action 
would have occurred even if the employee had not engaged in a pro-
tected activity.75 
C.  Third-Party Retaliation Claims 
Most courts have been unwilling to extend the protections of Title 
VII’s anti-retaliation provision to third-party retaliation claims.76  Third-
party retaliation occurs when an employee has engaged in a protected 
activity, and the employer, in an effort to retaliate against the protected 
employee, takes an adverse action against an associate or relative of the 
protected employee.77  Courts have ruled that these third-parties do not 
qualify for protection78 because, under the anti-retaliation provision, an 
employee must either oppose an unlawful employment practice or partic-
ipate in an investigation of suspected unlawful employment practices to 
be engaged in a protected activity.79  Because third-parties who are asso-
ciates of a protected employee have not actively opposed or participated 
in investigations, courts have interpreted the language of the statute to 
exclude this class of employees from protection.80 
                                                            
 72. Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 73. See generally Salas v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 493 F.3d 913, 924 (7th Cir. 2007); Shafer v. Kal 
Kan Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d 663, 664–65 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 74. Kiel v. Select Artificial, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999).  But see Thomas, 379 
F.3d at 812. 
 75. See Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1297 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 76. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 564 (3d Cir. 2002); Smith v. Riceland 
Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 820 (8th Cir. 1998); Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc. 89 F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir. 
1996). 
 77. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 564; Smith, 151 F.3d at 820; Holt, 89 F.3d at 1227; Long, supra 
note 27, at 933–34. 
 78. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 564; Smith, 151 F.3d at 820; Holt, 89 F.3d at 1227. 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006). 
 80. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 564; Smith, 151 F.3d at 820; Holt, 89 F.3d at 1227. 
562 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:553 
Yet, allowing employers to retaliate against those who engage in 
protected activities by taking adverse employment actions against the 
protected employee’s friends, relatives, and close associates, cuts against 
the policy aim of the anti-retaliation provision.81  Prior court decisions 
have broadly interpreted the language of this provision to avoid the 
“chilling effect” that employer retaliation would have on the likelihood 
of other employees bringing claims.82  Additionally, courts have general-
ly held that “anti-discrimination laws are to be liberally construed to ef-
fectuate their remedial purposes.”83  The conflict between the interpreta-
tion of the language of the retaliation provision and the policy behind the 
statute’s enactment has left courts split regarding whether the protections 
of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision extend to cover victims of third-
party retaliation.84 
Courts that have refused to extend protection to third-parties have 
read the language of the anti-retaliation provision narrowly.85  While ac-
knowledging that such a reading may encourage employers to retaliate 
against a protected employee’s friends and relatives, these courts have 
maintained that the language of the provision prohibits any other result.86  
Based on a strict reading of the anti-retaliation provision, these courts 
believe that extending protection to pure third-party retaliation victims 
would rewrite the law.87  Courts justify this reading by suggesting that 
although the interpretation conflicts with the policy of the anti-retaliation 
provision,88 failing to provide protection to third-party victims of retalia-
tion is not patently absurd.89 
Some courts have gone further and suggested at least two reasons 
why Congress may have intended to narrow the class of protected parties 
to those who have either participated in an investigation or opposed an 
unlawful practice.90  One reason includes speculation that friends and 
family members “at risk of retaliation typically would have participated 
                                                            
 81. See Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 122 F. Supp. 2d 335, 347 (N.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
 82. See Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981); 
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63–64 (2006). 
 83. Holt, 89 F.3d at 1231 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (citing MacDonald v. E. Wyo. Mental Health 
Ctr., 941 F.2d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1991)). 
 84. Compare Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 564, Smith, 151 F.3d at 820, and Holt, 89 F.3d at 1227, 
with Gonzalez, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 347, and EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 
1213 (E.D. Cal. 1998). 
 85. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 564; Smith, 151 F.3d at 820; Holt, 89 F.3d at 1227. 
 86. See, e.g., Holt, 89 F.3d at 1226–27. 
 87. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 567 F.3d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Bojangles 
Rest., 284 F. Supp. 2d 320, 327–28 (M.D.N.C. 2003). 
 88. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 811. 
 89. Id. at 808; Bojangles, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 327. 
 90. See Thompson, 567 F.3d at 811; Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 569. 
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in some manner in the discrimination charge.”91  Thus, this position is 
based on the hope that all associates and relatives that should be pro-
tected from retaliation have participated in preparing a Title VII claim.92  
This viewpoint also assumes that these associates have participated suffi-
ciently to qualify for protection under the participation clause and can 
sufficiently prove a prima facie case of retaliation.93  While courts advo-
cating this reason may believe that occasions of pure third-party retalia-
tion in which the victim has not participated in the discrimination charge 
or performed an action opposing an unlawful employment practice are 
rare, fact patterns seen in several cases make it clear that these situations 
do occur.94  Even if uncommon, it seems absurd that these cases would 
somehow not violate the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision when 
courts deny these plaintiffs relief. 
Another reason for not allowing third-party retaliation claims to 
proceed is that such an interpretation may “open the door to frivolous 
lawsuits and interfere with an employer’s prerogative to fire at-will em-
ployees.”95  But this concern is exaggerated, as seen by a similar provi-
sion in the Americans with Disabilities Act,96 and can also be addressed 
by the requirement of a causal connection in making a prima facie claim 
for retaliation.97 
While some policy objections exist to allowing pure third-party re-
taliation victims to seek redress in court, these objections are easily over-
come.  The policy behind the anti-retaliation clause of Title VII clearly 
supports allowing these plaintiffs to bring claims.  Indeed, the Third Cir-
cuit stated that interpreting the anti-retaliation provision to prohibit third-
party retaliation claims “presents a conflict between a statute’s plain 
meaning and its general policy objectives.”98  Nevertheless, the majority 
of courts do not allow pure third-party retaliation claims under the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII.99 
                                                            
 91. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 811 (quoting Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 569). 
 92. See id.; Bojangles, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 327–28. 
 93. See Bojangles, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 327–28. 
 94. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 564; Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d at 820 (8th Cir. 
1998); Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir. 1996); Bojangles, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 
327–28; Gonzalez v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 122 F. Supp. 2d 335, 347 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); 
EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1213 (E.D. Cal. 1998). 
 95. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 570. 
 96. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (2006) (prohibiting an employer from “excluding or otherwise 
denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an indi-
vidual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association”). 
 97. See infra Part IV.C. 
 98. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 569. 
 99. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 564; Smith, 151 F.3d at 820; Holt, 89 F.3d at 1227. 
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III.  THE IMPACT OF CRAWFORD ON PURE THIRD-PARTY RETALIATION 
CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII 
The Supreme Court, in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of 
Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, reexamined the definition of 
oppose as it relates to the opposition clause of the anti-retaliation provi-
sion in Title VII.100  Section A examines the facts and analysis of the 
Crawford decision and section B explores the decision’s impact on pure 
third-party retaliation claims under Title VII. 
A.  The Crawford Case 
Veronica Frazier, a human resources officer for the Metro School 
District (Metro), conducted an investigation into alleged sexually harass-
ing behavior of a Metro employee—relations director Gene Hughes.101  
Frazier’s investigation was internal to the school district and started as a 
result of rumors of sexual harassment by Hughes.102  During the internal 
investigation, Frazier asked Vicky Crawford, a thirty-year-old Metro 
employee, whether she had witnessed any “inappropriate behavior” by 
Hughes.103  Crawford responded by attesting to several instances of 
Hughes’s sexually explicit behavior.104  During one incident, Hughes 
responded to Crawford’s question of “‘Hey Dr. Hughes, what’s up?’ by 
grabbing his crotch and saying, ‘[Y]ou know what’s up’” as well as 
putting “‘his crotch up to [Crawford’s bus] window.’”105  During another 
incident, Hughes entered Crawford’s office and “‘grabbed her head and 
pulled it to his crotch.’”106  Two other employees also relayed incidents 
of being sexually harassed by Hughes.107 
After finishing the investigation, Metro took no action against 
Hughes.108  Instead, Metro fired Crawford and the two other witnesses to 
Hughes’s behavior.109  Crawford filed a charge of retaliation with the 
EEOC, followed by a suit in District Court for the Middle District of 
Tennessee.110  Crawford claimed that Metro had violated both the oppo-
                                                            
 100. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 849 
(2009). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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 110. Id. at 849–50. 
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sition clause and the participation clause of Title VII’s anti-retaliation 
provision in terminating her employment.111 
The district court granted Metro’s motion for summary judgment.112  
In dismissing the case, the court held that Crawford did not qualify for 
protection under the opposition clause because she had not initiated her 
own complaint but simply answered questions in an internal investiga-
tion initiated by someone else.113  Similarly, the court held that Craw-
ford’s claim for protection under the participation clause failed as well.114  
The court reasoned that, pursuant to Sixth Circuit precedent, a participant 
in an internal investigation qualifies for protection under the participation 
clause only where the investigation is part of a pending charge by the 
EEOC.115  Because the investigation by Metro was internal and not the 
result of a pending EEOC charge, Crawford’s participation in the inves-
tigation did not qualify her for protection under the participation 
clause.116 
Crawford appealed the district court’s decision to the Sixth Circuit, 
which affirmed.117  The Sixth Circuit stated that protection under the op-
position clause “demands active, consistent ‘opposing’ activities.”118  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.119 
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed and re-
manded the Sixth Circuit’s decision.120  The Court determined that the 
term oppose, as used in the opposition clause of the anti-retaliation pro-
vision of Title VII, carries its ordinary meaning—“‘to resist or antagon-
ize . . .; to contend against; to confront; resist; withstand.’”121  The Court 
also defined oppose to mean “‘to be hostile or adverse to, as in opi-
nion.’”122  The Court criticized the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning as under-
mining the retaliation provision’s primary objective of “avoiding harm to 
employees,”123 and stated that the Court has never suggested that an em-
ployee may “lose statutory protection by failing to speak.”124  By expand-
                                                            
 111. Id. at 850. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. (quoting Bell v. Safety Grooving & Grinding, LP, 107 F. App’x 607, 610 (6th Cir. 
2004)). 
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 121. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1710 (2d ed. 1958)). 
 122. Id. (quoting RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1359 (2d ed. 
1987)) (emphasis added). 
 123. Id. at 852 (quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)). 
 124. Id. at 853 n.3. 
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ing the definition of oppose so broadly, the Court potentially embraces 
the notion that the opposition clause protects an employee who opposes 
by virtue of “silent opposition.”125  Even if the Court did not intend to 
embrace silent opposition, the definition the Court provides is broad 
enough to encompass opposition by relationship. 
B.  Crawford’s Impact on Pure Third-Party Retaliation Claims 
Courts should read Crawford’s expansive definition of the opposi-
tion clause to offer protection to previously unprotected third-party vic-
tims of retaliation.  The majority of courts have not been able to offer 
protection to pure third-party claimants because the language of the anti-
retaliation provision requires a plaintiff to oppose an unlawful employ-
ment practice or participate in an investigation, and pure third-party 
claimants do not raise complaints or participate in investigations prior to 
suffering an adverse employment action.126  But the Court’s expansion of 
the definition of oppose can be read to allow the passive support of 
friends, relatives, and close associates to qualify as opposing an unlawful 
employment practice, thus qualifying the third-party for protection under 
Title VII. 
While the Court’s opinion does not explicitly state that pure third-
party retaliation claims are covered by the opposition clause, the opinion 
contains at least two features that support this reading.  First, the Court 
criticizes interpretations of the anti-retaliation provision that fail to ac-
complish policy objectives.127  Second, the Court applies the opposition 
clause to a circumstance in which traditional opposition may not have 
been present.128 
In Crawford, the Court is critical of the Sixth Circuit’s interpreta-
tion of the statute because it failed to take into account certain policy ob-
jectives.129  The Court stated that the Sixth Circuit’s rule largely under-
mined the statute’s “‘primary objective’ of ‘avoid[ing] harm’ to em-
ployees.”130  Additionally, the Court found that the Sixth Circuit’s hold-
ing would undermine incentives put into place by the Court’s decisions 
in Farager v. Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v Ellerth.131  
Both Farager and Ellerth create vicarious liability for employers when 
                                                            
 125. Id. at 854 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 126. See, e.g., Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1226–27 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 127. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 851–52. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 852. 
 130. Id. (quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)). 
 131. Id. 
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an employee’s supervisor creates a hostile work environment.132  But 
these decisions also create an affirmative defense if the employer “exer-
cised reasonable care to prevent and correct” discrimination and the em-
ployee did not use certain available processes.133  This scheme was 
enacted in part to give employers sufficient motivation to seek out and 
prevent discrimination in the workplace.134 
The Court in Crawford indicated that the Sixth Circuit’s holding—
allowing employees who answer questions in internal investigations to 
be targeted by employers without court protection—would undermine 
the policy supported by Farager and Ellerth.135  If allowed, this conduct 
might discourage employees from answering questions about discrimina-
tory conduct or aiding in internal investigations, thereby reducing the 
effectiveness of the investigations and undermining the rationale for pro-
viding an affirmative defense to employers who carry out such investiga-
tions.136  The Court’s criticism of the Sixth Circuit’s failure to give effect 
to the broad policy of limiting discrimination should serve as an interpre-
tive guide for subsequent court decisions.  This criticism supports a read-
ing of the anti-retaliation clause that would allow pure third-party retalia-
tion claims.  Failing to provide protection to victims of pure third-party 
retaliation is a violation of the policy goals of Title VII—the same type 
of violation the Court criticized in Crawford. 
A second feature of Crawford that supports allowing pure third-
party retaliation claims is the Court’s application of the opposition clause 
to the facts of the case.  The Court held that Crawford’s response to the 
investigator’s questions constituted opposition to her supervisor’s harass-
ing actions.137  Notably, the Court cited no characteristics of Crawford’s 
responses that qualify her answers as opposition to her supervisor’s con-
duct.138  Rather, the Court stated that Crawford’s responses qualify as 
opposition to the discriminatory conduct because communication to an 
employer about the employer’s discriminatory conduct “virtually always 
‘constitutes the employee’s opposition to the activity.’”139  Such a pre-
sumption of opposition supports the proposition that a third-party—by 
virtue of the relationship with a complaining employee—opposes the 
                                                            
 132. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 766 (1998); Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 
U.S. 775, 808 (1998). 
 133. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 134. See generally Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742; Faragher, 524 U.S. 775. 
 135. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852–53. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 850–51. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 851 (citing 2 EEOC COMPL. MAN. §§ 8-II-B(1), (2), p. 614:0003 (Mar. 2003)). 
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complained-of unlawful employment practice, thus qualifying for protec-
tion under Title VII. 
IV.  READING CRAWFORD TO ALLOW PURE THIRD-PARTY RETALIATION 
CLAIMS FURTHERS THE POLICY OF TITLE VII AND TRUMPS EXISTING 
REMEDIES AND COUNTERVAILING CONCERNS 
While Crawford’s definition of oppose may allow courts to extend 
the protection of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision to victims of pure 
third-party retaliation, it does not necessarily require this extension.  This 
Part argues that courts should extend this protection because it furthers 
the policy goals of Title VII in general and the anti-retaliation provision 
in particular.  This Part further argues that existing remedies are insuffi-
cient for victims of pure-third-party retaliation and that concerns of fri-
volous lawsuits are exaggerated because sufficient safeguards exist to 
prevent this result.  Using Crawford’s definition of oppose to reach pure 
third-party retaliation claims furthers the policy goals of Title VII and 
will not result in excessive litigation. 
A.  Allowing Crawford’s Definition to Reach Pure Third-Party Retalia-
tion Claims Furthers the Policy of Title VII and Unifies Conflicting Sig-
nals to Employers 
Extending the anti-retaliation provision’s protection to pure third-
party victims is appropriate for several reasons.  First, an expansive read-
ing of Crawford furthers the policy goals of Title VII.  Second, such a 
reading unifies conflicting authoritative messages sent to employers.  
Third, expanding the reach of Title VII aligns with recent developments 
affecting the scope of protection of Title VII. 
The policy goal of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is to “avoid 
harm to employees”140 and to “maintain unfettered access to statutory 
remedial mechanisms.”141  The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII is 
designed to avoid the “chilling effect” employer retaliation would have 
on the willingness of other employees to bring forth claims of discrimi-
nation.142  Allowing an employer to retaliate against relatives and close 
associates of employees who participate in protected activities under 
Title VII would certainly be enough to deter employees from seeking the 
protection of remedial statutory mechanisms and chill the willingness of 
employees to bring forward claims of discrimination.  Thus, extending 
                                                            
 140. Id. at 852 (quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)). 
 141. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 54 (2006) (quoting Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)). 
 142. Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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Title VII’s protection to victims of pure third-party retaliation furthers 
the policy goals of the anti-retaliation provision. 
Extending this protection to pure third-party retaliation claimants 
also unifies the messages courts send to employers.  Currently, courts are 
conflicted about whether pure third-party retaliation victims have a claim 
under Title VII.143  Reading Crawford to allow such claims based on an 
expanded interpretation of qualified protected activities would result in a 
single rule of law and provide a clear message to employers as to what 
constitutes a lawful employment practice. 
Interpreting Crawford to allow pure third-party retaliation claims 
would also clarify a second contradictory message employers receive.  
The EEOC, the government entity charged with enforcing federal em-
ployment discrimination laws,144 and the courts disagree in their interpre-
tation of the statute.  Specifically, before a party can bring a lawsuit 
against an employer for violation of Title VII, he or she must first file a 
claim with the EEOC.145  Upon receipt of a charge of a statutory viola-
tion, the EEOC is required to accept and investigate the complaints.146  If 
an investigation determines that the employer is engaged in unlawful 
employment practices, the EEOC is required to engage with the employ-
er in attempts at conciliation in order to rectify the practices.147  If the 
attempts fail, the EEOC may bring a lawsuit or allow the aggrieved party 
to proceed with a private suit.148  Thus, the EEOC’s interpretation of the 
applicable employment laws is crucial to the outcome of a dispute. 
The EEOC publishes a compliance manual that interprets applica-
ble employment laws.149  The compliance manual states that the provi-
sions of Title VII “prohibit retaliation against someone so closely related 
to or associated with the person exercising his or her statutory rights that 
it would discourage that person from pursuing those rights.”150  Thus, the 
EEOC’s own guidelines prohibit the practice of pure third-party retalia-
tion,151 but many courts have held the practice does not violate the provi-
                                                            
 143. Compare Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 564 (3d Cir. 2002), Smith v. 
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sions of Title VII.152  This disagreement between the government agency 
charged with enforcing Title VII and the courts’ interpretation of the sta-
tute sends an unclear message to employers.  While the EEOC com-
pliance manual is considered “a body of experience and informed judg-
ment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance,”153 
in the matter of pure third-party retaliation, the majority of courts have 
ruled against the EEOC’s interpretation.154  Interpreting Crawford to al-
low pure third-party retaliation victims to bring claims would resolve the 
conflict between the courts and the EEOC and clarify the mixed message 
currently being sent to employers. 
Extending Crawford to reach pure third-party retaliation claimants 
also aligns with amendments and interpretations that have broadened the 
scope of coverage for Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.155  For exam-
ple, the Court in Burlington Northern expanded the scope of what consti-
tuted “discriminating against” an employee because a lesser scope 
“would not deter the many forms that effective retaliation can take.”156  
Additionally, Congress amended Title VII itself to expand the statute’s 
reach.157  The Act first required an employer to have twenty-five em-
ployees to be subject to the Act’s provisions, but Congress amended Title 
VII to reduce this requirement to only fifteen employees.158  Following 
this progression of expanding coverage, courts should expand the scope 
of protected activities to include opposition by virtue of association with 
an employee who has availed herself of the protections of Title VII.  The 
Crawford decision allows courts to do this by expanding the definition of 
oppose.159 
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B.  Existing Remedy is Insufficient 
Although the majority of courts have not allowed victims of pure 
third-party retaliation to bring claims,160 strict adherence to the language 
of the statute does allow a remedy for these claims, but this remedy is 
ultimately insufficient.  The Court in Burlington Northern set the stan-
dard for what constitutes retaliatory conduct: if an action “might well 
have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge 
of discrimination,” it is sufficiently adverse to constitute retaliatory con-
duct under Title VII.161  Under this standard, a complaining party could 
conceivably bring a claim for retaliation when an employer takes an ad-
verse employment action against his close associate or relative.162  Be-
cause firing a friend or relative is likely to dissuade a worker from mak-
ing a claim, this action may give the originally complaining employee a 
claim for retaliation.163  The originally complaining employee would be 
able to show a prima facie case of retaliation: she engaged in a protected 
activity by complaining, suffered an adverse employment action by hav-
ing her associate terminated, and that adverse action was caused by her 
engagement in a protected activity. 
Although an employee who makes a claim of discrimination under 
Title VII could sue an employer who terminates a close associate or rela-
tive, such a suit does not sufficiently affect the policy goals of the anti-
retaliation provision.  The employee bringing suit will not have been di-
rectly adversely impacted by the employer’s actions against the associate 
or relative.  Thus, the remedy available in such a suit will be limited to 
emotional distress damages.164  This remedy will neither reinstate the 
associate or relative, nor will it be likely to result in sufficient distress165 
to elicit much in the way of damages from the employer.  As a result, this 
remedy will not deter harm to employees or foster an environment in 
which employees feel comfortable asserting claims under Title VII.166  
Rather, to affect the policy goals of Title VII and the anti-retaliation pro-
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572 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 34:553 
vision, the victims of pure third-party retaliation must be permitted to 
bring a claim on their own. 
C.  Concerns About Applying Crawford to Allow Pure Third-Party Retal-
iation Claims Can Be Overcome 
Critics of Crawford’s definition of oppose claim that the expanded 
coverage of the opposition clause may allow any employee who suffers 
adverse employment actions to bring a retaliation claim.167  Opponents 
fear that Crawford’s broad definition of oppose covers even unexpressed 
opposition to alleged unlawful employment practices.168  The concern is 
that any employee who suffers an adverse employment action could al-
lege that the employer retaliated against the employee in response to the 
employee’s unspoken and unrevealed opposition to an alleged unlawful 
practice. 
But, as previously noted, safeguards against frivolous claims al-
ready exist to overcome this concern.  Including a pure third-party’s pas-
sive opposition in the category of protected activities only satisfies one 
part of a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII.169  To qualify for 
protection, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he or she engaged in activity 
protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse employment 
action against him or her; and (3) a causal connection exists between the 
protected activity and the adverse employment action.170  Expanding the 
opposition clause gives third-party plaintiffs the ability only to meet the 
first element of the prima facie case.  As part of showing this initial ele-
ment, a potential plaintiff must still demonstrate a reasonable belief that 
the conduct in question was unlawful.171 
Most potential plaintiffs will not have trouble satisfying the second 
element of adverse employment action.  An employee is unlikely to bring 
a lawsuit in the absence of suffering an adverse action because the plain-
tiff will neither have been provoked to sue, nor have a basis for a claim 
of damages.  Additionally, the Court’s decision in Burlington Northern 
expanded what employer activities can constitute an adverse employment 
action,172 making it easier for plaintiffs proceeding with claims of pure 
third-party retaliation to meet the second element of the prima facie case. 
                                                            
 167. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 854 
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Yet the third element—causal connection—will serve as an appro-
priate barrier to frivolous pure third-party retaliation claims because it 
requires showing that an employer took an adverse employment action 
against an employee because of the employee’s involvement in a pro-
tected activity.173  This element is often difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy.  
Generally, no direct evidence of the employer’s unlawful rationale for 
the adverse employment action is available.  This element also requires 
that the employer knows the employee is engaged in a protected activi-
ty.174  For a pure third-party retaliation plaintiff, this means the employer 
must know of the relationship between the originally complaining em-
ployee and the third-party victim. 
The obstacles in proving the causal connection element make suc-
cess difficult for a plaintiff claiming retaliation under Title VII.  But this 
difficulty can also serve as a safeguard to protect employers from frivol-
ous claims.  Putting the burden on the plaintiff to show that the adverse 
employment action directly resulted from the employee’s engagement in 
a protected activity blocks employees from proceeding with meritless 
claims.  Even if the employee successfully shows he was engaged in a 
protected activity, the employee still bears the burden of proving the ad-
verse employment action is causally related to the protected activity.175  
In the case of pure third-party retaliation victims, the protected activity 
would be opposition by virtue of the relationship to a complaining em-
ployee.  Thus, the third-party retaliation plaintiff would need to show 
that an employer took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff 
as a result of the plaintiff’s relationship with a complaining employee, a 
challenge sufficient to bar frivolous claims from moving forward. 
The necessity of establishing a close relationship in third-party re-
taliation claims serves as a further bar to frivolous lawsuits.  Although 
the concurring opinion in Crawford cautioned that such a liberal reading 
of the opposition clause “would open the door to retaliation claims by 
employees who never expressed a word of opposition to their employ-
ers,”176 this concern is remedied by requiring a close association or rela-
tionship.  By requiring that the third-party has a close association or rela-
tionship to the original complaining party, the concern that employees 
who do not express opposition may be protected from retaliation is exag-
gerated.  Allowing pure third-party retaliation victims to bring suit does 
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not give every employee who suffers an adverse employment action the 
ability to bring a lawsuit by claiming the employee harbored silent oppo-
sition.  Rather, the opposition must exist by virtue of the relationship to 
the original complaining party, and as noted earlier, the employer must 
be aware of the close association or relationship between the third-party 
and the original complaining party.  Thus, not every employee who suf-
fers an adverse employment action would be able to qualify for protec-
tion.  The class or parties who qualify for protection under a broad read-
ing of Crawford is narrow enough to prevent a multitude of frivolous 
lawsuits. 
Finally, while courts that refuse to offer protection to pure third-
party retaliation victims have cited concerns of excessive frivolous litiga-
tion,177 these concerns are exaggerated.  The Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA)—an anti-discrimination statute similar to Title VII—
demonstrates why these concerns are exaggerated.  The ADA contains a 
provision that expressly allows claims by individuals “with whom the 
qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association.”178  
For instance, in Trujillo v. PacifiCorp, a husband and wife brought a suit 
under the ADA based on the relationship or association provision.  The 
Trujillos, both employed at PacifiCorp, had a son with a brain tumor.179  
PacifiCorp, a self-insured company, paid all medical costs directly.180  
Eleven days after the Trujillo’s son suffered a relapse, the employer be-
gan investigating both Mr. and Mrs. Trujillo for time theft.181  Eventual-
ly, PacifiCorp terminated the couple, removing the Trujillo’s son and his 
expensive medical care from the company’s insurance plan.182  The Tru-
jillos were able to sue as victims of discrimination due to their relation-
ship with a member of a protected class, their disabled son.183  Thus, as 
Trujillo demonstrates, the ADA explicitly allows claims based on an as-
sociation or relationship. 
This ADA provision suffers from the same practical difficulties that 
concern opponents of extending Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision to 
pure third-party retaliation.  The ADA, by allowing claims to be brought 
based on a relationship or association, embodies the broad protection that 
courts opposed to extending protection to third-party retaliation victims 
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fear,184 but this provision has not resulted frivolous lawsuits.  According 
to the EEOC, in 2009 61.3% of all Title VII claims received by the 
Commission resulted in a finding of no reasonable cause for concern in 
the allegations.185  In the same year, only 59.5% of all ADA claims re-
sulted in a finding of no reasonable cause.186  In fact, Title VII has had a 
higher percentage of meritless claims than the ADA for the last twelve 
years.187  The ADA, with its broad provision covering parties with asso-
ciations to qualified individuals, had fewer instances of meritless claims 
than Title VII.188  Hence, extending similarly broad protections in a 
Title VII context will not result in a higher occurrence of frivolous 
claims. 
Allowing Crawford’s expanded definition of oppose to include pure 
third-party retaliation victims would further the policy objectives of Title 
VII and not result in excessive litigation.  This interpretation would en-
courage employees to report discrimination, while the causal connection 
requirement would prevent meritless claims.  Similar protections con-
tained in the ADA demonstrate that concerns over excessive litigation 
are exaggerated. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Crawford’s expansive definition of oppose in the opposition clause 
of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision should be interpreted to allow 
pure third-party retaliation claims.  When the Supreme Court reduced the 
effort required to be considered opposing unlawful conduct, it opened the 
door for victims of pure third-party retaliation to be protected.  The pri-
mary rationale for withholding protection from pure third-party victims 
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was that the language of the statute required personal participation in a 
protected activity.189  This limitation, which courts have admitted con-
flicts with the policy goals of Title VII,190 has been overcome by Craw-
ford’s expansion of the definition of oppose, leading to a broader range 
of protected activities.191  The Crawford decision compels a reading of 
the anti-retaliation provision to reach pure third-party plaintiffs.192 
Additionally, the policy goals of Title VII lend support to an inter-
pretation of Crawford that would extend protection to victims of pure 
third-party retaliation.193  Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision encourages 
employees to bring discrimination claims forward and ensures access to 
the statute’s protections.194  Allowing this interpretation of Crawford lim-
its the ability of employers to suppress Title VII claims through retalia-
tory conduct and resolves the current contradictory messages regarding 
pure third-party protection under Title VII.  For these reasons, courts 
should interpret Crawford’s expanded definition of the word oppose to 
extend protection to pure third-party retaliation victims under the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII. 
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